Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1978

Melvin A. Cook and Wanda O. Cook v. Noel L.
Cook : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Cook v. Cook, No. 15811 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1286

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN

THE

SUPREME

Cl1liRT

OF

THE

STATE

OF

UTAH

llELVIN A. con K
ViANDA G. COOK

PLAINTIFFS- RESPONDENTS

Case No. 15311

vs.
~:nEL

L. Cff1K, et al,
DEFBWA,\TT -

APPELLANT

APPELLANT 1 S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs - Respondents, Melvin A, Co0k and Yfa.rida G Conk, his wife,
bmught

an act ion in two c0unts a gaiDst Appellant.

One c0unt was to

:rr-reclose on a mortgage on ~e real J:'roperty of the Appellant.
0

joined as defendants in this action.

The ResP,ndents

Lien holders Vera O. Cook (Baacher):

Tromson Electrical Co.; Lila A. Co0k, Janis B. Smith and Martin Smith as
guardians ad litem for Cameron R. J,hn, a minor; and Credit Bureau of Iogan.
Defendants answered setting forth d1cketed claims.

In adiitfon Defendant

Vera O. Cook c.ross- claimed for supp-,rt payments due since she last dockeded
a judgment for same.

In the sec0nd count Plaintiffs - Resp0ndence set forth a claim for

rn,~ey

lend to Appellant, which Appellant derred in his answer, but now concedes admitting to have paid twenty five hundred of this m"ney to Res]:))ndents in one
lump sum.
RELIEF SOUGIIT
Appellant m>ti1ns f0r a new trial on all issues and bef0re al~ litigants
and in additinn requests the Court to consider Newly Discovered Evidence •
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DISPOSITION IN THE IDWER roURT
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1
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The Trial Judge, Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, found that R
espindent 1
were entitled to foreclose mortgage, and ordered a sale and set forth the
priorities of lien holders.

Additfonally theC,.,urt gra11ted Plaintiffs _

Resp:mdents m-,tfrm for partial summary judgment nn thesec-,nd c"unt fl'lr
m"'ney lent, and granted
due support payments.

Co-Defendant Vera O. c,.,,.,k•s cross claim for past

These judgments were added to the list of liens

against tte Appellant's property.
Appellant had judgment set-aside for investiga ticn of fraud, The ,judge
sustained the judgment ruling on affidavits only. A new sherrif sale was
set and executed, funds distrisuted with notice of need of return of same

I

in event a new trial led to reversal.

\
I,

STATEMENT OF FACTS

.

Appellant hB'g '1ad difficulty engaging dependable council to represent
him due to indigent circumstances.

On the occation of the foreclosure his

legal council was rn:>t informed of the facts thus appellant was stipulated
to facts adverse to his ease and c"ntra ry to his pleadings.
Appellant is a farmer owning land irrigating 80 acres in Box Elder Cg,
On llay 22, 1.972 Respcndent loaned i12, 500.00 to J!.ppellant to pay off
existing debts.

This note was re+ired rt:arked "paid" and in lG?J a new note

was drawn up by Resµmdent for $13,000.00 to be repaid over a ten year period.
In newly discovered evidence a third and subsequent mortgage was found in

the form of an extension of time agreement or a new modus operandi.

Only the second of these mortgages was considered 8efore the court as
follows:
Thia mortgage is given to secure the following indebtedness: Note on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1oan to N .L. CC'nk of Thirteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars, said note .carrying

a date of Way 22, 1972 and carrying a rate "f 6% interest per annum to lte paid
in ten equal installments at the rate of $1300.00 per year simple interest pay-

able quarterly.
The Mortgag>r agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on said premises and
a reas0nable attorney's fee in case of foreclosure.

See

Resrnndents exhibit "D"

Thus we see that this Ill"rtgage gave no right to accellerate the payments
in case of default.
In 1973 a hail storm totally destroyed the crops of Appellant who at the
same time was refused further credit by R.esp::mdent in which to purchase needed
sprinkler equipment. Neither wnuld Res:i::ondent accept full return of the loan
when tendered by way nf a Federal Land Bank loan.

Under these C'">nditions the

Appellant tried unsuccessfully tn flood irrigate sandy land during

1~73-74.

In

the spring of 1975 Appellant leased his farm for three years.
In 1974 ResJhndent baned Appellant additi,.,nal

main line _buried and permanent
repaid in one lump sum.}

~"

plastic -pipe;,'·~::

funds in which to purchase

.

($2,500.00 of which was

The Appellant had also made some interest payments

on the first loan as shnwn

~y

exhibit

In this time of hardship Resrnndent did not press for payments and refused

to accept offer of Appellant to return the l'">an in full with all interest in
1974 and again in 1975.
when he replied:

"No,

In each case the tender was rejected by Respondent

I don't need the money."

This failure to require payment C'>ntinued by varinus waivers and refusals
f,,r another three years.
On January 8, 1976 in a newly discovered letter from Resrnndent to the
Appellant he repeated his past lienency by writing:
"We want y,.,u to clear up all ynur debts as rapidly as P'lSsible and then

it Will be time enrrngh for you tc start paying us off•" Signed Itel and Wanda.
Appellant accepted this forebearance acting on it and implementing its
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pressing oblig;otfons. At the sarr.e time Appellant trusted wnrd of

Resi:n~d.
l
. e1t :.:,: I

!

they would wait until other credibrs were paid first. A Chattel ll.ortgaRe was
given by Api:;ellant uns...,licited to Respondent as further evirlence of fiis in:en(".
~,

tci complete an equitable settlement of all claims. This
Respondent in the same spirit.

!

I

was accepted by the

It then becarr.e mandatory for Respondent to sir,

each and every check frnm the farm prriduction Vlhich he faithfully did from 19'7\
thru 1977 handing the check back to Appellant each time saying: "Here, go

?J1rl

pay other people first."
During this perfod Appellant had to rely on his W"'>rking wife for
expenses travebng to the far!!l in a 1963 ford pick-up truck

h0uoehol~

using fur.cs onl;i ·:I

recover from the loi::ses fMm the hail storm and to pay pressing nrites and bills, ·
Even while exercising extreme frugality farm taxes went unpaid for

197~

addinp

two payments with added costs which were finally n:ade in November of 1977 all
of which was an added worry to the Appellant.
Under these conditions creditors whose payments were unfulfilled

.

d~cketed

Respondents foreclosure or were sued in and "rurnng the fore!1Ylst was his ex-wife,
Vera

o.

Cook(Baacher), who has eeen well emplayed at around Jl5,ooo.oo per year,

Appellant was unable to get other work due tc his age of sixty years and
the necessity to work during the spring, summer and fall on thefann.The year
1975 was a go,.,d one as lessee spant his full time on lessors land, but in 1976
and 1977

production was a disappoinment since lessee tnok the most ofthe water

frnlil the irrigation well to his adj.,cent la'1d leaving Appellant's land s~<Jrt on
irrigation water resulting in low production.

In thelate fall ofl976 the Appellant was jailed for c,..,ntempt for his fail·
ure to consistentzy pay child support while he claims they were paid at least in
part for many mnths during this perfod.

\Jpcn his release on afternol'ln of

December 10, 1976 he went directly to obtain council of attorney Omer Call of
Brigham City who took the case on condition that Appellant w11uld come ll.0 nday
morning December 13, 1976 and spend the day in preparatfon for the hearing
Sponsoredwhich
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Resrnndent L'elvin A. Conk did in fact phone Appella""'.t at exactly 6:00 a.m.
on December lJ, 1976 stating emphatically thus: "THE?.E WILL EE NO FDRECWSURE•• •
come to Salt Lake City now and I will loan you sixty th,.,usarid chllars t,., be rep;r·id in a year by yriur refinancing.

as ~he will n l:!ed t0 sign papers."

Bring your fan:: deed a'ld y,.,ur wife Helen
Appellant reSIY'"!ded ¥:ith the f0llowing:

"That is f(00d news. I don •t have a deed .iust r,ow but I do have ari abstract of
title frnm which a deed c·1Uld be made." To this the ?.esD-o,dent replied: "Then
bring that. 11

Appellant said: "I have engaged an at tnrney for the hearing shall

I release him?

II

The Re~p-ondent, kelvin

a

c,-,ok rei:;lied:

''Y"ll rrJfht as well."

vdthin two h0urs time and at the Cross-road Texico Service Stati,.,:--1 snuth
intersection

in Brigham City Appellant phoned att0:r.iey Call who said: "

I'm

glad to hear that there will b~o foreclosure since I have had nn time to look
at the case

and I am in no way prepared for the trial had it been held t11-

mrrow."
Appellants

then went directly to

Respon~ents

office

in the Beneficial

•
Life Tower J 5 South State Street placing theAbstract ofTitle directly in the

..

hand of the Resp:mdent who placed it in the right ha!:d drawer of his desk.
Appellant returned t0 the same office s-ime three weeks later

for the express

purpose of recoverirg his abstract of title and t'-,is ti.'L,e it was located in
the office of Respondents Attorney accross the hall in the same building.
Nothing but hollow promises and delaying tactics i::roceeded throughout the
remainder of the day to the effect that matters so important as had been
promised needed time to work them out.

This Appellant ::learly understcod

trusting explicitly in a long standing fiduciary relationship with the
respondent.

At length Resv.ndent said his C'>11nc il was in Coalville and

he had called and w-iuld not beback to Salt Lake u_ntil ll:OO p.m. and it then
would be necessary for the Appellants to remain overnight at the h'>me of the
Resinndents for thefirst time in history.

His C'lwcil did n,,t ret,Jrn that

night at all and ab.., 11 t 9:00 a.m. December 14, 1976 Res!))ndent announced: "I
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seemed omvir,us rushed to Bri.,.ham
City C,.,urt oouse enteri·nr:. c-,n f use d ,
"'

-d-:-:----•
is-,rient
"1,

surprised, uninformed as to their le!!!;al rights and entered the cnurthouse Wi'.lout council of any kind.
Of these happenings Respondent has faithfully denied in CCJntinuous effort

i

to defend the judgment he seized that day by circumventi-,n.
Later Appellant shall deITr>nstrate that basic C'">ntradictions do in fact exist ,
in signed statements by letter and under C'">urt Oath in Respcndents CounterAffidavit presented before the c,.,urt of &ix Elder Cnunty l'arch 10, 1978, On
tl:at occation the District Judge had openly ann,..,unced earlier that judgment
would be by affidavit only, that testirrnny wrrnld not be allowed mr wnuld the
I

Appellant bepermitted to cross-examine the Resp·rndent.

5ince this was the

essiot!

I

of Appellants defense acti,.,n t<"l ,..,btain permissi<"ln for certain supeona information defendant-Appellant was thus severely penalized,
ARGUllENT
POINT I

Appellant was denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial when the
Plaintiff-Respondent circumvented the law, practiced fraud up::m the court, misl!li
the Appellant 'by" use of artifice or trick representing that he need not prepare
for the hearing as there would be none, siezing a judgment and otherwise

general~

JI

making a nncke;y of justice.
When Appellant realized he had been deceived by what he thought was a lnyal

1

brother he immediately objected by u ting the word ''trick" in a request for a neir \
trial.

The exact happenings of December 13 and 14th 1976 are made available for ,

careful study
Appella.1t now seeks a new trial based on perjured affidavits before the
Court and on Newly Discovered Svidence contained in an amendment which was
rejected by the district judge.

This rejection

· 't of

was contrary to the sp1r1

federal rules of civil proceedure which permits amendmer.ts of a material nature
to ee accepted " anytime".
FDINT II
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fatal defect appearing on the face of the m:irtgage.
Motivated by the fact that acceleration of the entire amount of the L(...,!"tgage
was contra ry to the terms of the imrtgage and thus improper as a matter of law
Respondent and other litigants acted to prevent presentation of available defense
ly Appellant

by means of deception and false imprisonment having never invest-

igated claims of Appellant that he was in very deed without means to supp:>rt
himself durin~ this, his ec'"ln0mic depression.

The actions of Respandent on

December 13th and1.4th 1976 are thought to hccve !teen rrntivated not only by what
has already been-related mut by a desire to prevent Appellant from seeking and
obtaining a continuance f0llowin5 his 30 days in ,jail.
The initial note of May 22, 1972 was exchanged on November 30, 1973 for
a Mortgage with installment payments and an express provisfon for foreclosure
upcn default.
agreement.

Thus the parties :rrodified the original note by a sultsequent

This subsequent agreement vrhile providing for foreclosure did not

..

provide for acceleration of payment upan default •
Upan failure to provide for such a right no right exists.

In Bank v.

Boherty 29 Vfash. 233, 69 P. 732 (1902) the Court held that where no provision
in the contract for accelera tion of principal upon failure to pay interest
that no right to acceleration and subsequent foreclosure could exist because
of failure to pay interest.

See generally 54 A.L.R. 1230

In Walker Bank and Trust Company v. Neilson, 26 Utah 2d 383, 490 P. 2d

328 (1971) this Court said that an acceleration clause was not self-executing,
but that it was the mortgage optfon to declare the full aJ!l'"lunt due. Since an
existant accelerati...,n clause cannot operate unless exercised, one certainly
cannot be impased when it does mt exist.

This is an axiom to the propasition

that there can ee no default until after the amount is due.
closure by the Resmndent if proper at all

Thus, the fore-

sh...,uld have been limited as a

matter of law to an action for amounts then owing and should not have been
allowed for am.... unts not yet due.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III
A statutory question .;_~ inv-ilved in a waiver or ext ens inn cf t ·

ime ar,reem•r:.

submitted as Newly Discovered .C:vidence since it was accepted by Appellant, was
totally lliplemented, later f0rgntton having eluded th'">rouph search by .~ppellant
and his family as they s0ught a 11 memoranda, papers, letters and etc. related
to the case.

This particular letter was nnt rerrembered at the trial and was r.ot

recalled again until it was act,1ally discovered after the trial.
This Extension of Tllie agreEment appeared in this letter dated January 8,
1976 and took the form

of a new contract or new m,..,dus operandi and the latest

dated and is thus stated in clear and un uesti,..,nable tE:m.s as f,,llows:
you to clear up all y·ur del::ts as rapidly as i=ossible, tr,en it will
for you to

~

.i:aying us off."

Record P. 129.

"Ne ;·:a,.:

be tfae ,~1 .,

Three f;10nths later Rescondent

declared the entire arn-,unt due and subject tri foreclosure.

The Appellant was

surprised and 8ecause of theshort tllie and the am'"lunts accelerated he could not
then tender the amount due.
The District Court erred in not holding that by such continual forebearance
the Respmdent thus waived their right if any existed to accelerate the amriunt
due and to foreclosre the

p:r~operty.

In American Savings and Loan As soc. v. Blomquist, 21 l'tah 2d 239, 445 P. 2d

1968. tniS

c..,urt said th at waiver of the default may preclude the party from

acceleration of the indebtedness.

Although in that case there was m basis for

the claim of waiver, but in this case there was substantial evidence tri sh~w that
the h'esp·mdents did in fact waive the default.

The rule expressed by B]Qmci_uist

supra is that a waiver must be an intenti-inal relinouishment of a kn')Wn right,
distinctly made expressly or impliedly.
The letter of January B, 1976, expressly waives the default for the present
and for sometllie in the future.
demand, but

The frrnr year peri,.,d of fnreuearance with1 ut

with reassurances is of itself significant evidence of a waiver.

The refusal of i;endered paymants or full repavment in 1974 and again 1975 are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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further evidence of Respondents intent to waive the debt.
Jn the winter of 1976 a time when the money earned from the fann was spent,

the Appellant vrns in a position of havi~ relied on the waiver and was unable to
cure his default after the acceleration was made.

The waiver having lteen definite

then, as a matter of equity and according to Blomquist, supra the Respomlent shoulli.
have been estopped fr0m accelerating the am'mnts due a"'1d fr<1m thus 9enefiting from
their past waiver of corr.plaince.

Payments were due yearly in V.ay and tev:in,; waived

them in early 1976 Respondent should have given until llay 1977 before default and
foreclosure could be sought.

The waiver having

9een definite, knowing and inten-

tional there was no right to demand payment at that time, and no right to accelerate
the debt(had the agreement provided for such a remedy which it did not.)
This rule is c0nsistent with taat ofother jurisdictions. In Cambell v. Werr.er,
Fla,2J2 So. 2d

(252) (1970) the Court citing cases said:

The decisions disclose that foreclosure on an accelerated basis may be denied
where the right to accelerate has been waived or the mortgagee estoppeti to assert it,
because of conduct of the mortgagee from which the mortgagor, .reasonably could assume
that the mortgagee, for or upon a certain default, w-,uld n"t elect tn declare the
full mrtgage indebtedness to be due and payable or forecbse therefor; ••••
In D•Orazio v Uascianto,

345 Pa. 428, 29 A 2d 4J. (1942) the Cnurt held the

mortgagee was precluded from foreclooing the m,,rt.gage by a written agreement allowing the principal to be paid when able i f the interest were paid.
Waiver 8y agreement has been found to be effective as to past defauUs or
to those occuring before notice has been given of an intention to insist upnn
strict performance in the future,
Lettereri v. Mistretta

See 148 A.L.R. 686 at 690 citing cases.e.g.

102 N.J. Eq 1, 139 A 514 (1927) where an ~ral agreement

for payment of interest semi- annually instead ofquarterly waived the right to
require quarterly rayments with~ut giving notice of,b.ntent to insist on strict
performance.

See also

97 A.L.R. 2 d 9 ::J8 at 1007 an

d case cited.

Appellant was given n" notice of an intention t.o depart from the past acts

I

!

t

I

~

of
forebearance
fromLaw
the
waiver
notice
givenprovided
in theby letter
ofthat
year,
Thus, Services
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been waived,

no n:.tice of stdct perf0rmance in

2!1d

payments having been given.
Extensi0n of Time is binding rin rn0rtgagee and may bee as'ierted by nnrtgag,-.
as

\•:ell as by the purchaser of the rn-,rtgaged prriperty wh, has ;issumed the rre.

gaged debt.

115

A.L.R. lOJK,1054,1055

To give sue h an Extension of Tiir.e

and then to foreclose is tandamrnnt to fraud 115A. L. R. 1038.

This is <:S]:X3cial:

true where Appellant offered to pa,y the debt, .~ccepted the cxte'lsion, ;icted 8 ~
using

his means to

~bide

by its terms,

Dea;and note came due after first default in pgymer.t. 1tet'po:",dent did n~thir
about it frir f;:n.ir years then before the term nf the mY:ti:;a,r;e the '1esp-mdent tr:
a newly created situation had a legal right to then and tl-iere foreclose, but
instead

of insisting upan that r:ip,ht, he entered in.to a written concession for

the pa:;"lilent of the balance due which
c-,nditions

UP'JD

c0ncessfon c0ntained within

itself the

so.

which parties on the 0ne side extended and on the nther side

accepted the c-,ncessions which created a new m'1dus operandi. See 115

.~.L.R. 10)~

By such represe:1tation ta the effect that the time to pay was to be extended,
may not thus take advantage of him
be c0ntrary

to

~uity

by declaring the whole mrtgage due. It

~e

w0u~

and good c0nscience to allow such a result. This would Ii

especially true where mortgagor offered to pay the m'1rtgage. See 124 A.L.R. lOll
Appellant used reasonable diligence to discover and produce evidence at the
trial. Failure to do so was not the result of negligence and had the newly discovered evidence been before the cnurt in all likeli:.Ood the verdict would have
been different.
Due to a series of unav,.,idable circumstances s~rMunding the trial Appellant
was sc:.rprised, rrd.sled, and acted contrary to what he other1dse would have dnne
relying on a strong fj.d11ciary and crmfidential relationship to the effect that
there w-iuld be n'.l f,-,reclnsure and was injured

the~eby.

Under Utah Code Rule 59 (a) an insufficiency of evidence where verdict was
plainly
affect

v.Tong in light of newly discovered evidence sufficient to materially
results in a new trial warrents t;ourt to set aside the verdict judgment

6 l't~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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f{)INT IV
Perjured testimony under oath and evidences of misconduct of other litir;ants
is brought out in the following counter-affidavit befnre the Court.
"I am pleased that you are taking c,.,nsiderable pride in making your farm
venture pay off, and especially l':hat Y'">U have d·me with Eoyd l.'a!"l::le •. to get
everything under Boyd and raise such a fine, large beet cmp. :: surely wish you
success." See Par 3 of Letter dated January >i, 1Q76
In c--,nL-ast: "Prbr to January 1976, plaintiffs were aware that defendant
Noel L. C,,,0k was n,.,t mal'Jaging and farming said real property in such a manner as
to enable him to pay his debts and plaintiffs did enc,,,urage said defendant to
J:'IY his other ciebts bef,.,re µi.ying plaintiffs •••• " See par, 12 Respondents Cm:nter Afr:

Tr.us we see the waiver

supported again but two op)Ylsfog p-iints of view,

Again Appellant represented in reviewing happenings of Jeceml::er 13, 1'1 76
that Resp:;ndent
placing it in

reouested bringing the Abstract of Title tn Salt .Lake City

th~very

affidavit he states:

hand of Respandent at his office.

In Respondents C'">unter-

"When affiant asked defendants if the;: had brought title

to their property with them, Noel L. Cook said that he C'.luld n't find it. 11
This was a perjured statement since it had been discussed earlier that day
and why the cuesti0n at all if Resp--,ndent had not

been inf·nined earlier that

day as t,., a new course of action and the need for the title.

The district court

totally failed to put together the simplest C<>nstruction which is one main assigned duties of courts of equity when real property ls involved.
~nother

example ofperjured testimnny Respandent said: None of the sums loaned

by plaintiffs to defendant NoelL. Cook as aforesaid were repaid and on or about
the 25th of 1'.arch, 1976 plaintiffs filed suit against defendant Noel L. Cook
and the other parties above named seeking in Count I of their complaint to
foreclose the m0rtgages referr"lci to in par. 3 and 4 hereof and in Count II
to collect the amount referred to in paragraphs 5 lierfof •. , See par
Arrounts

paid aee

on exhibit

6 C!ounter A~f; J.,

The latest agreement was a Wrtiver

or exte:-isi 'n of time.
Thereafter, plai~ tiffs learned thz-,ugh discussi -,ns with creditl'r'1 of
Defendant
Cook
said
defendant
wasprovided
not paying
his debts
•• " and
SeeLibrary
par,14
c.a.
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money coming to Appellant was \ieing used to pay his bills.
Resp·mdent wrote:

"After the 8th day of January, 19'">6 but before th~ cornm-Jl

encement ,,f this action, affiant learned that said real p!'">perty was beinl'; sold
at a f.,reclnsure sale, whereup,n affiant caused

his att,..,:rr.ey tn contact the

r
.l

att.-,rney f,..,r the party wh., was causi.,g said Jl"l4'erty to ee s•ld and to persuade
II

him ••• (toward cnnsolidati.-,n) See par 15 C.A.
Fact

was Appellant told !'tespondent that Fa:r.i.ly Services was foreclosinr

1

and asked riespondents advice as to what he thought Acpellant sh,.,uld do about it,
Respondent said:

"Tie

1r1

:-:-our property and dnn 't contest the court cases. "Lat;·

Resp::indent sued all the creditors in on the action to clear the title
Appellant then

borrowed -$1234.00 from the Bear River State

Bank paying off Fa'llily Services even th-,ugh Appellant had ]'.llid three years longer
than needed for his daughter Carolyn, and had actually built up a credit.

Respind~

then said ab0ut the payment to family services "'::hy did you do that ? 11
Problems which Res)J'"'ndent encountered and discussed in paragraphs 22 and 2)r
his counter-affidavit are tmse which Resinndent shrrnld have W•rked out ahead of
the ann"uncement that "There would be no f,.,recl,.,sure,"

'!'he fact that it did not

work out for Respondent was n.-,t the fault of the Appellant but defendant had put
his trust in the promises dismissing his c•uncil supP"lrted by Res pendent to do so
resulting in i1.9ury and harm to his cause and hardship in making a living.
No attempt at settlement either in Salt .Lake City or at the court house as
far as Appellant was involved was given. Appellant was excluded and any discussiou
going on were behind closed doors. See par. 29 C'1<mter--affidavit. ResP"ndent pho~/
an attorney to represent Appellant v:hen he arrived at the Court House, but this
attorney was not

lnformed as to facts and Appellant was stipulated

to facts

adverse to his case and c,.,ntrary to his pleadings.

POINT IV
EVIDENCE THAT OTHER LITIGANTS KNE/i OF FATAL DEFECT AND ACTi':D 'ID Hil-1DER APPELLANT
Attorney for Vera

o.

1

Cook 'P'ho was himself to profit by the foreclosure and
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d

~1

appropr"1ate time to jail Appellant immediately before the trial for

gspecially where it is the duty of an attorney to !mow
nesses of a contract

some concern

th~;

days.

the strengths and the weak-

should lie involved in m-itive in this case. The

words used by this attorney before the district judge of the case was that Noel L.
Cook was hiding money.

He knew this to be false when he r.:ade it.
fraud involved in State Farm Ins.

Another litigant Smith Vs Cook there is

Group claiming th0usands of d0llars in medical and dental bills fMm a c,.,llisfon
v:here ~.r s Smith ran bmadside intn the pick-up truck of Appellant t--talling it out
v'\en it was i'inked f0r .$25.00 •

This sh--uld be looked up-rn with suspician w'ien in

fact !!rs. Smith said at eite 0f wreckage and collisi,.,n:
0 i;r

"Let's each take care of

-,vrn d-mage since n0 one has been hurt and fog pnve:-ited eac11 nne of us fr,,m

seeing the other. 11
P01NT

V

Divorce decreee provided no lien on the real property in this acti-m and a judgment
should mt be permitted to determi11e the contract or supercede it. Vera O. Cook took
her lien on other property which she and Appellant acquired together.
The ,judgment by the lower court for child suPP"rt when visitation rights are
denied and when father is withriut income was improper.
Appellant has geen without sufficient income to provide for himself since the
entry of her divorce which she alone wanted when A ppellant lost his teaching jolt.

The district c,.,urt nevertheless granted a judgment for support for the period of
the last judgment to the time of the trial.

Appellant denied that he had sufficient

income to pay the suppart payments of .jpl00,00 per IIr>nth.
The inability to be a8le to make payments because of lack of income is a proper
basis for excusing contempt or for reducing the amount of supp,-,rt to be paid. For

ex.ample, in MacDonald v Superior Court, 40 Cal. APP 2d 517,104 P. 2d 1071(1940)
the Court ordered the trial Court to hear such

rrnti-m 'based on the fact that the

husband was unemployed while the wife was employed with a satisfactory income. This
rule has been follow~d in a ma.iririty ,..,f cases. See 6 A.L. R. 2d BL 5
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There are numer-,us IJtah cases dealing with the authority of th~-::..,ur'.: to
reduce supp:irt decrees fo acc":-dance with the pmvisi'"lns of U.C.A, (1953) ~ 3~,.·
when there are chani:;ed circumstances • .3ee e.g. Colum~o v ,·;2lker f'a:-ik anc '.':-u,v
------.:...
26 Utah 2d 350, 4R9 P 2d 998 ( 197 l); Peters v Peters 15 Utah 2d 413, 394 p, ;~

71 (1964)
In Earl v t:arl 17 Utah 2d l5b,406 P. 2d 302 (1%5) this C>urt s:iid th 2 t ~:
proper circumstances

2

Cnurt might make payments for SUN"rt depc:ndent up:in a c

custodian making the child available for visitati~n rir,hts,
In this case, the Hesp-wdent Vera

o.

Cnok (Baacher) wife, h:o.s arbitr•ril;.·

refused SUll'Jner visitation rights given by div0rce decree for
Appellant father.

Up to six weeks,

In addition, other rights of visitation were refused based:·

a claimed need for prior n0tice,
Bxcusing the failure to pay.

under such circumstances theCourt erred in:·:

This is particularly so where

empl,.,yed while the father is heavily in debt and unable tn

0

the ex-wife is wel.
btain sufficie:it ir.c.

fr..,m his fann to meet his own needs,

FOJNT VI
Evidence of abuse of discretinn is sh,.,vm below:

a.

Judge refused to ace ept
an only amendment which vinlates
the spirit of the federal rules of civil pll:lceedure,

b.

At no time was Appellant permitted to take the •dtness stand to
present an available defense.

c.

The judge refused the Appellant opp:Jrtunity sought to cr-iss-exa:
the Res pendent in set-E:s lde hearing on fraud wi. thaut a jury whe'.'
the sole purp-,se was t0 obtnin permission of ctesinndent forcersupeona information essential to his defense.

d.

The judge ll!ade little effort at simple c'>nstruction of circUJ!lstanti al evidence in pcssible fraud vrhich violates the principal
duty of ccurts of eciuity dealing with real pmperty.

e,

Early in the h earing the judge stated that he.was r:ady at H~:
time to rule on the case thus p'"li:iting up ~ssible bias, pr-.iu ·
and which he was not able to overcome.

0

;

·"l
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Sliis~rict Cnurt in

Cl,an,

Utah by all the dncketed claims except one

agam~t

him.

Due to indigency anC. negative ratin;: i:;h·en by a litigant Credit Bureau ,.,f Vii:;an
Appellants financial ability was imp;iired p->inting up a weakness of our Court
system.

This resulted in bias

of the judge toward the rlppellant.

Under Utah Rules of Civil froceedure Rule

59 New Trials: Amendments of

judgments the grounds for a tfow Trial are set forth.
( 1)
2 dverse

Irregularity in the prcceedings nf the c,.,urt, jury or

party, or any order of the court to abuse of di2cretion by v!J!iich either

party was prevented frnm having a fair trial.

[,ave gcarC.ed ai;ainst.
( 4)

Newly di~overed evidence, material for the party rr!iking

the application which he could not, with reas,.,nable diligence, have discovered
and produced at trial.

Appellant presented to theTrial Court evidence of his detention in jail
o:-. contempt prior to the hearing, of Respondents false representation of settlement, of his inability to participate at the trial, in his inadequate attempt to
represent hi1nself, and further evidence ofthe Resp->ndent•s waiver of compliance
Vlith the terms of the mortgage.
The pr oper presentation of this evide!lce at a new trial would have presented
to the Court the question of whether Res]X>ndent waived his rights to accelerate
and foreclose.

The evidence shnwed that the failure t,., properly present this

issue was due to Appellant's last minute atten;pt to obtain an attorney and his
lack of preparation.

He tried unsuccessfully to obtain said C'">uncil while in

jail as evidenced by a call to a Clearfield, Utah Att'"> mey who refused for econ-

orr.ic reasons.

The poor presentation was due to the short time between trial

and his release from .iail and suggestions of settlement which caused Appellant ,
already pressed for money to release his attorney obtained December 10, 1976
or one bcsiness day bef,,re the trial doing this with the statement of ResP'.Jndent
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The Court with this evidence constituted "Irregularity :i.·n th

epruc eedings of

the Court.. by which •• (a) party was prevented from l:aving a fair trial. 11
Furthermore, the letter of January 8, 1976,made definite allegatinns of
forebearance that were otherwise mere allegations my Appellant.

Thus under sub.

division (4) of Rule 59 the new evidence presented made a material difference in
the case since this was Appellant's main defense.
In V.an Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank , 48 Utah 606, 161 P. 50 ( 1916) u-.e Court
said that where such evidence makes clear that which, without it, v;c_s obscure and
extremely doubtful, especially where it is direct •.•. then a new trial srould be
awarded.

In this case the letter t0 Appellant fr"m ":espondent Vias direct evidenci,

o:f past waivers which vrere material part of Appellant's defense.

Un.!'ortunately this evidence was not properly presented to the trial Court.
Such a failure was excuseable where it was caused by misrepresentations by the
other party that there w:::n.;ld be no f,.,reclosure and that there wculd be a'lother ploi!
of repayment and where the Court was fully aware of Appellants inadequate represent
ation of his case and need to obtain proper council;

Appellant should be av;arded Att0mey 1 s fee necessary to bring this appeal.
In Swain v Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P 2d

709 (1955) this ·Court said that the awarding of attorney's fees on appeal is discretinnary with the C"urt.

Such discretion is to be exercised in light of the

equities of the case.
Appellant has been forced todo witl:out proper representation because of lack
of income 'l'rhile being charged with the attrirney's fees for the

Resp:mdents.

The little money he had, being inthe land to be foreclosed, Appella'1t was f orced
by the terms of the c0ntract to finanee his foreclosure when he couldn •t borrow
enough money to cure default or defend himself had he been given the op)X)rtunity.
·
and unlawful
Based on the argument of Appellant setting forth the llllproper

y'sl

nature of Respondents foreclosure, the Appellant asks the C0urt to award att1Jrne '
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C0NCLUSION
In the set-aside of judgment on hearing on fraud without jury the judge
and trial court erred in pre-announcement that judgment would be by affidavit
only,

The judge stated early in the hearing that he was at that time prepared

tn rule on the case thus i:ointing out a pre-judgment prompted by prejudice.
Appellant was denied acceptance of

an

o~:y

amendment,

permitted to cross-examine the Respondent and was denied opportunity to
tt0stify.
Appellant was clearly misled due mainly to a reliance on a strong fiduciary and brotherly relationship where wrongdoing was easily accomplished.
As a matter of law trial court erred in allowing Respondent to accelerate
pl

yments and toforeclosi:

when there was no provision :in the mnrtgage for it.

Newly discovered evidence must be heard in the district court where it is
material and holds a possibility of reversal.
Tortfeasor activity permeates the entire case nntivated by error affect:ing
substantial and constitutional rights of Appellant adversely.
F:inally the trial court erred in awarding judgment for supPJrt to
Respondent Vera O. Cook ( Baacher) when Appellant

was without income and was

being denied his proper visitation rights.
Right of all parties intermingled with injustice and interdependant due
to tort activity and the need to protect deed of trust fnr benefit of the
principal m1rtgage h'"llder.
Respectfully su'lllnitted:

qaL.:r.~A·
<7//e&~
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